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Abstract
This article discusses the absence of reflexive or self-caused readings
in certain types of participles and de-verbal nominalizations, like the
hanging of the suicidal patient and The suicidal patient was hanged
yesterday. I argue that the “anti-reflexive” reading is not triggered by
the presence of a subject PRO or pro, but rather by the absence of re-
flexive marking, i.e. overt marking that functions to recode lexically
specified co-reference relations between the arguments of a predicate.
I argue that the verb-phrase needs to be decomposed into at least
two subparts/subevents and that each sub-event carries information
about the participants involved in it (as in e.g. Pustejovsky 1995
and Ramchand 2008b). More specifically, arguments receive their
thematic information from indices on verbal heads that introduces
sub-events. Event-denoting nominalizations and participles in gen-
eral inherit the event structure from the verb, i.e. the indices present
in the verbal roots. I further argue that simple reflexives can be ver-
bal heads, that are inserted as a last resort when there is a mismatch
between the lexically stored information of a verb and the structure
generated in the syntax. This article focuses on data from Swedish,
but comparisons will be made with English.
1. Introducing the phenomena
Baker et al. (1989) point out that reflexive, or self-acting/self-caused read-
ings are unavailable in eventive passives, as illustrated below for English:
(1) a. The children are being dressed. 6= The children are dressing
themselves.
b. The climbers are being secured with a rope. 6= The climbers
were securing themselves.
Rather, the passive sentences in (1) seem to mean something like:
(2) a. Someone is dressing the children.
b. Someone is securing the climbers with a rope.
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Reflexive readings in nominalizations and participles
This is one of the main reasons why Baker et al. (1989) chose to analyze
the passive morpheme as an incorporated external argument. The reflexive
reading should be unavailable since it would not be possible to move a co-
indexed argument over the incorporated external argument (which should
induce a Strong Crossover effect and/or violate principle B or C of Chomsky
1981).
Kratzer (forthcoming) notes that reflexive/self-caused interpretations
are equally unavailable in eventive nominalizations:
(3) a. The hanging of the suicidal patient forced the hospital to check
their security routines.
b. The article praised the expeditious securing of the climbers.
The interpretation of the nominalizations in (3) is given in (4):
(4) a. the hanging of the suicidal patient = someone hanged the sui-
cidal patient (6= the suicidal patient hanged himself)
b. the expeditious securing of the climbers = someone secured the
climbers ( 6= the climbers secured themselves)
The main purpose of this article is to show that the obligatory non-reflexive
interpretation in eventive passives and even-denoting nominals is not trig-
gered by a syntactically present external argument. Rather, information
about the transitivity/arity of each verb is given in its lexical entry, and
this information is equally present in true verbs as in participles and event-
denoting de-verbal nouns. Reflexive-marking functions to alter the arity of
the verb. The absence of a reflexive interpretation in eventive passives and
event-denoting de-verbal nominalizations thus follows from the absence of
reflexive elements in the passives and nominalizations.
This article focuses on Swedish, where the facts seem to mirror the
English data presented above. However, Swedish uses reflexive elements
to a higher degree than English for both typical anti-causative verbs (i.e.
verbs like open and spread ) and reflexive verbs (e.g. obligatorily with verbs
like wash and dress), which makes Swedish a better language for this type of
study. The result of this study extends to English and other languages with
less use of reflexives (see section 5 for ways of dealing with cross-linguistc
variation).1
In Swedish, for many predicates, a reflexive interpretation is never avail-
able when the verb surfaces as a passive participle, not even in typical “ad-
jectival” contexts. Most obviously, the reflexive reading is out in eventive
passives:2
1In this article I will have nothing to say about languages that use identical mor-
phology for encoding both passives and reflexives/anti-causatives, e.g. Greek (see e.g.
Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2004) and Albanian (see e.g. Kallulli 2007).
2List of abbreviations: def = definite, inf = infinitive, init = initiation, nom =
nominalizing suffix, part = (passive) participle, past = past tense, pl = plural, poss =










The copula used in (5), bli, triggers event-denoting readings in almost
all contexts, i.e., bli followed by a passive participle has the same event-
implications as a simple tensed verb (see e.g. Lundquist 2008 for discus-
sion). In these contexts, just as in English, no reflexive interpretation is
available. As shown in (6) and (7), no reflexive/self-caused interpretation
is available either when the stative copula vara (‘be’) is used, or when the


















However, certain verbs have corresponding participles that lack event impli-
cations, i.e., participles that only denote a state, see Kratzer (2000), Embick
(2004) and Lundquist (2008) on so called target state participles, or stative
participles3. When the stative participles appear in typical “adjectival”













‘He is still chained to the fence.’
= superlative, sup = supine, trans = transitive, unacc = unaccusative.
3I will use the term stative participle in this paper. Note however that this term does
not refer to participles formed from stative verbs, like the hated man, which tends to
behave like eventive participles.
4In this paper, I will use the adverb fortfarande (‘still’) to diagnose stativity in par-
ticiples. See Kratzer (2000) for discussion on this diagnostics. Still can in general only
be used with predicates that do not imply a change of state (states, activities and im-
perfectives/progressives in general). Note however that still can be used with change of
state predicates yielding a slightly different reading, as in e.g. They still incarcerated
him, and we’ll never forgive them for that, even though they let him go right away.
Here still does not modify an ongoing process (as in They are still incarcerating radical
thinkers) or a result (as in He is still incarcerated, i.e., still in jail). Still with change
of state predicates rather seems to function as a meta-comment, and this use will not
be taken into account in this article. Still modifying progressives and generics will not
be discussed either. Fortfarande ‘still’ will only be used as a diagnostics for detecting
event-entailments in passive participles. I will call the participles that are not compatible
with fortfarande ‘eventive’ or ‘event-implicating’ participles. This group includes those
participles that are called resultative or resultant state participles by Embick (2004) and
Kratzer (2000). Crucial to the argument in this article is that these participles contain
a syntactically present event-predicate.
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The person in (8) might very well have chained himself to the fence – the
sentence (8a) and the DP (8b) above simply give no information about who
did the chaining. Note that the adverb fortfarande ‘still’ in (8a) forces a sta-
tive reading of the participle. Note further that this adverb is incompatible
with the participles formed from a verb like hänga ‘hang’ (see Lundquist










‘He is still hanged.’
Note further that the self-caused/reflexive reading is impossible with the












‘He was (being) chained to the gate.’
The difference between (8a) and (10) is striking – the former is straight-
forwardly felicitous in a context when someone has chained themselves to
the fence, while the latter simply is not. In short, self-caused/reflexive
readings are only licit when no event-entailments are present. Many verbs,
like hänga ‘hang’, cannot form participles that lack event entailments, and
can therefore never have a reflexive interpretation, not even in typical ad-
jectival contexts (e.g., as prenominal attributes). The ‘eventive’ copula bli
selects for eventive participles in most contexts, and hence the string bli -
participle is not compatible with a reflexive interpretation (see Lundquist
2008 for discussion on the selectional restrictions on bli).
For nominalizations, the same effect obtains: nominalizations based on
transitive verbs are only compatible with reflexive/self-caused interpreta-
tions once no event entailments are present. Take the nominalizations
formed from the verb hänga (‘hang’): for whatever reason this verb has
only an event-denoting nominalization. The nominalization in (11) can
only have a transitive reading, i.e., a reading that is incompatible with a
suicide interpretation (even in contexts when a suicide interpretation would











‘the hanging of the suicidal patient’
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Just as with the passive participle formed from hänga, no self-caused read-
ing is available.5 As shown in (12), the transitive reading is not triggered by
the presence of a DP in what might be considered a direct object position
(i.e., the of-phrase), since the reflexive interpretation is highly marked even


































‘Hanging is one of the most common methods of execution.’
In (12a), only a reflexive interpretation would be plausible, given that a
suicide necessarily is self-caused. A self-caused reading is however not ac-
cessible from the nominalization, and therefore, the sentence is infelicitous.
In a transitive/non-reflexive context as in (12b), the argument-less nom-
inalization works fine. It should be pointed out here that the class of
event-entailing nominalizations that gives rise to obligatorily non-reflexive
interpretations is not identical to what Grimshaw (1990) calls Complex
Event Nominalizations. It seems that many simple event nominals also fall
into this class.
Just as for participles, certain nominalizations lack event-entailments.
Whereas non-eventive participles denote a state, non-eventive nominaliza-
tions tend to denote an object that is the result of an event (see discussion
in e.g. Grimshaw 1990). When nominalizations denote a result object, a













‘An early Beatles recording was found in the attic.’
The Beatles recording in (13) might very well have been recorded by the
Beatles themselves, though, of course, someone else might have recorded
5There are some correlations between the availability of stative readings in nominal-
izations and participles. However verb-class is also important, as it turns out that many
unaccusative verbs have stative participles, but no “stative” nominalizations (see section
6 four more discussion on this issue). This fact mirrors the generalizations made by Hale
and Keyser (see e.g. Hale and Keyser 2002) regarding noun-based and adjective-based
verbs, only here we are dealing with overtly derived nouns (i.e. nominalizations) and
adjectives (i.e., participles). I abstract away from from these patterns here. The most
important point is that the reflexive interpretations are systematically correlated with
the possibility of stative interpretations, and absent with the eventive ones.
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them.
The topic of this paper has been discussed before (see e.g. Baker et al.
1989, Kratzer 1996 and Kratzer forthcoming). The kind of data presented
above has lead previous researchers to conclude that a subject/external ar-
gument is syntactically present in both passive participles and (eventive)
nominalizations, either in the form of a pro, PRO or as an impersonal pro-
noun (but see especially Pesetsky 1995 for a discussion of the problems with
such an approach). Either Principle B or Principle C of the binding theory
of Chomsky (1981) would presumably rule out the reflexive interpretations
in these cases. (The exact technical explanation will be skipped here). We
should therefore be able to explain the absence of reflexive interpretations
in (13) and (12) using the same toolbox, as schematized in (14)- (15):
(14) a. They/one/someonei secured the climbers∗i,j .
b. PROi to secure the climbers∗i,j was a good idea.
(15) a. the (pro/PROi) securing of the climbersj,∗i.
b. The climbersi were being pro/PROj,∗i secured.
To account for the availability of the “reflexive” interpretation of the sta-
tive participles, a lexicalist solution has been proposed by e.g. Baker et al.
(1989). According to such a solution, stative participles are formed in
the lexicon, before any arguments are present, while eventive participles
are formed in the syntax, presumably after argument structure has been
added. During the last 20 or so years, many analyses have been proposed
to deal with basically all types of nominalizations and participles in the
syntax, in the spirit of Abney (1987). According to analyses following this
trend, the participle/nominalizing morphology is merged in the syntax –
before the external argument has been introduced in the stative cases, but
after in the event-denoting cases (see e.g. Embick (2004) for an analy-
sis of different types of participles). My analysis will be in spirit of the
Abneyian/syntactic solution, but I will argue against the presence of an
external argument/subject in event-denoting nominalizations and event-
implicating participles.
The claims I want to make in this paper are the following:
1. There is no evidence for a subject PRO/pro or a syntactically present
impersonal pronoun in passive participles and event-denoting nomi-
nalizations.
2. Co-reference relations between arguments are specified the lexical en-
tries of verbs. The information about co-reference is still present when
the verb surfaces as an eventive participle or nominalization. The ab-
sence of a reflexive interpretation thus follows from the information
stored in the verb.
3. A decomposed verb phrase, as in Ramchand (2008b), combined with
a specific set of rules governing lexical insertion, as in Caha (2009),
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can handle the differences between eventive and stative passives, and
event-denoting and stative nominalizations.
I will further argue that anaphoric elements like sig can be part of the
decomposed verbal functional sequence in the syntax, with the function of
changing the co-reference relation between the arguments of the verb.
1.1. Structure of the paper
In the next section I will show that there are no good arguments for the
presence of a PRO or pro external argument in most types of nominal-
ization or in participles. Most importantly, there is no difference between
eventive and stative/result participles/nominalizations with respect to the
syntactic presence or absence of PRO or pro. In section 3 I lay out the
theoretical assumptions about verbal syntax and semantics that are needed
for handling the data and generalizations discussed in this paper. In section
4, the (un)availability of reflexive readings in different types of participles
and nominalizations is derived from the assumptions in section 3. Section
5 gives a brief outlook of the implications my analysis has for the theory of
anaphors in general. Section 6 discusses limits on the formation of stative
participles and nominalizations. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Against PRO/pro in nominalizations and participles
As will be shown in section 2.1, there are quite clear indications that there
is no syntactically present subject/external argument in the types of nom-
inalizations that do not contain an accusative marked internal argument
(i.e., in derived nominals or mixed nominalizations, in the terminology of
Chomsky 1970). However, for passive (past) participles, it is harder to
prove either the absence or the presence of an external argument on syn-
tactic or semantic grounds, as will be shown in section 2.2. Most facts
however point to the conclusion that there is no external argument present
in passive participles either. This will force us to find a way of explaining
the anti-reflexive readings in passives and nominalizations that is not based
on the binding theory of Chomsky (1981).
2.1. Arguments against PRO in nominalizations
The presence or absence of PRO in nominalizations has been discussed
previously in the generative literature in e.g. Abney (1987) and Alexi-
adou (2001), and the general conclusion has been that no external argu-
ment is present in nominalizations - not taking ACC-ing and GEN-ing into
consideration. (Abney is not completely clear when it comes to the pres-
ence/absence of external arguments in mixed nominalizations (i.e., -ing
of-nominalizations)). Below, I will compare nominalizations with control
infinitives in Swedish, and show that whereas control infinitives always have
173
Reflexive readings in nominalizations and participles
a PRO in the subject position, nominalizations do not. I will look at two
different contexts where this is apparent.
2.1.1. No obligatory control in subject infinitives
The following two examples show that the implicit subject in an infiniti-

































‘It drives me crazy to party constantly.’
In nominalizations however, the interpretation of the implicit external ar-
gument is much more free. Here the main clause object is not necessarily































‘The constant partying drives me crazy’
The reader in (17a) and the “party-goer” in (17b) might be some arbitrary
person, or a specific person, whose constant partying is just driving you
crazy.
The following pair, which contains a weather-verb with a dummy sub-


























‘*To constantly snow drives me crazy.’
The experiencer object in (18b) is not a potential controller of the subject
position in the infinitive, and a PRO-arb interpretation would not be fe-
licitous. No suitable controller is present, which causes the sentence to be
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ungrammatical.6 In (18a) however, no control relation needs to be estab-
lished, and the absence of a potential controller is unproblematic.
In short, there is no need for a syntactically present controller of the
implied external argument in nominalizations, which I take to indicate that
there simply is no position that needs to be controlled in the nominalization.
2.1.2. Controller in Object Control Infinitives
The point that was was made above for infinitives and nominalizations
in subject positions can also be made for infinitives and nominalizations in
complement position. As discussed in Rizzi (1986), many languages require

































































‘They do everything to prevent people from bringing in nuclear
weapons to the Middle east.’
The infinitive can be replaced with an event-denoting nominalization. In
































‘They allow the use of condoms in certain cases.’
6Note that dummy subjects of weather verbs can control the subject of an infinitival
clause containing another weather verb, e.g. Efter att ha snöat i fem dagar började det
plötsligt att regna (‘After having snowed for five days, it suddenly started to rain’).
175

























‘They do everything they can to prevent the bringing in of
nuclear arms in the Middle East.’
Again, I take the absence of an overt controller as an indication that there
is no position within the nominalization that needs to be controlled.
2.1.3. Against pro
In last section I showed that there is no element in nominalizations that
requires a syntactically present controller. It might, however, still be possi-
ble for nominalizations to contain a null pronominal element that does not
need to be controlled, i.e. pro. However, there is an important piece of data
that indicates that this is not the case either. If the external arguments
in nominalizations were pros, we would expect that these would be able
to license reflexives in the complements of nominalized verbs. However, as




































‘They want to forbid the spreading of their own opinions.’
(21b) is ungrammatical in the reading where the reflexive possessor is bound
by the external argument of the nominalization, and marginal when the re-
flexive possessor is bound by the matrix subject. In the corresponding
passive sentence, where control from the demoted subject would be infelic-
itous, the possessive anaphor in the complement of the nominalization is
also bad:7
7It should be noted that reflexive pronouns can marginally be found in the comple-





































‘The constant celebrating of themselves on their own editorial pages, that is what



















‘The spreading of one’s own opinions was banned by the govern-
ment.’
Further, in clauses where we see violations of Principle B or Principle
C, the corresponding nominalizations show no such violations. This can be
seen in the following minimal sentence, where a non-reflexive possessor in





























‘During the performance of the controversial song-material in the
artist’s/his own hometown, riots broke out.’
Assume a context where a controversial folk-singer is touring the country,
he is not getting much response elsewhere, but when he reaches his home-
town a riot breaks out during his performance. The co-reference between
the implied external argument of the nominalization (i.e. the folk-singer)
and both the R-expression (‘artisten’) and the possessive pronoun (‘hans’)
possessor is unproblematic, while the anaphor is not fully felicitous. In a
corresponding finite clause, an anaphor would be the best alternative, and
the R-expression would be strongly ungrammatical. The pronominal form
would be marked:8
I will take this to be an instance of non-syntactic binding, and I will not in this paper
discuss this phenomena (note also that there are quite a lot of Swedes who would find
(i) ungrammatical). What is important here is that the reflexive (or the two reflexives)
in the complement could not be bound by a pro/PRO occupying the external position
of the verb in the nominalization. We can find evidence for this in the following piece
of data, where a reflexive occurs in the complement of picture-noun, and no binder is
present:
(ii) De utmanande bilderna p̊a sig själva p̊a sina egna hemsidor – det är det som stör
mig mest.
‘The daring pictures of themselves on their own webpages – that is what bothers
me the most.’
Why binding is not possible in (21b) is a separate issue (the most probable explanation
is the presence of a strong logophoric center in form of the subject of the matrix clause
in (21b), which is absent in (ii)). The important point here is that the availability of
what seem to be unbound reflexives is not conditioned by eventive nominalizations (and
the presumed subject contained in them).
8When the possessor is inside the direct object, we get the same effect, though the
judgement here is more shaky:
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‘When he performed the controversial song-material in the artist’s/
his own hometown, riots broke out.’
If a pro external argument were present in nominalizations, we would expect
the same restrictions on pronouns and R-expressions in nominalizations
and full clauses. The difference hence suggests that no pro is present in
nominalizations.
2.2. PRO or pro in Passive participles?
It is harder to argue against (or even for) the presence of an external ar-
gument in passive participles. One of the main arguments for having a
pro/PRO in passives is the fact that the demoted external argument seems
to be able to control a PRO in an infinitival purpose or rationale clause in
the complement of the passive participle (25a). This is not possible with
clearly agent-less unaccusative verbs, as in (25b) (see discussion in Landau
2000 and references therein):
(25) a. The ship was sunk (to PRO collect the insurance).
b. *The ship sank (to PRO collect the insurance).
However, as been pointed out by Williams (1985) and Lasnik (1988), control
into purpose/rationale clauses is also seen in contexts where either there
is no passivized verb in the matrix clause (26a) (from Williams 1985), or
where the controller is not the same as the demoted external argument as
in (26b) (Lasnik 1988):
(26) a. The thermostat is on low [PRO to save money].





















‘During the performance/performing of one of Dylan’s/his/the artist’s greatest
hits, the fans booed.’
Dylan might very well be the performer in the example above. It does sound slightly
clumsy when the name Dylan appears in the possessive, but not ungrammatical, I think.
There is at any rate a sharp difference between the nominalized version and a full clause
(när Dylani framförde en av Dylans∗i,j/hans∗i,j/artistens∗i,j största hits... (‘When
Dylan performed one of Dylan’s/his/the artist’s greatest hits... ’ ).
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Further, as been shown by Lasnik (1988), there are also cases where implicit
control is straightforwardly ungrammatical, as in (27):
(27) *The ship was sunk to become a hero.
Finally, the ungrammaticality in (25b) above is presumably not triggered by
the absence of a controller for the PRO in the infinitival clause, but rather
by the absence of an intent behind the event in the main clause. This can
be shown by using finite purpose clauses, where there is no control involved
(see Lundquist 2010 for ways of encoding intentions behind events):9
(28) a. The ship was sunk so that we could collect the insurance.
b. ??The ship sank so that we could collect the insurance.
I will conclude that control into purpose clauses is not a safe test for (or
against) the presence of external argument in passive participles. Turning to
binding, there seem to be indications that no external argument is present
(at least no external argument that has the properties of either pro or
PRO.) If an external argument were present in passives, we would expect
it to be able to bind a reflexive possessive pronouns inside a PP. This is
































int. ‘The whole cake was eaten up on his birthday.’ (i.e., he
ate the whole cake on his birthday)
It is however not quite clear what this tells us, given that reflexives are
usually bound by syntactic subjects anyway, or at least something highly
“topical”. However, even in impersonal passives, no binding from the de-
moted external argument is possible (with the caveat that Swedish does
not easily allow the participial passive in impersonal passives):10
9As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, another potential test for the presence of
external arguments is the presence of agent oriented adverbs, like intentionally or reluc-
tantly. These adverbs are marginally accepted in verbal passives in Swedish, preferably
in the morphological -s-passive. I take intentionality to be encoded in the verb itself,
just like agentivity. The reviewer further points out that secondary predicates could be
another test. The data here is more tricky, and although sentences like breakfast was
always eaten nude at the commune are marginally acceptable in English (though not in
Swedish), most adjectival secondary predicates are not, like e.g. *the game was played
shoeless (from Landau 2010) (see Landau 2010 for discussion).
10Note that some languages do allow reflexive elements in impersonal passives. This
is seen in German and Icelandic (see Schäfer 2010 for a general discussion, SigurDsson
1989 for Icelandic and also Åfarli 1992 for a discussion of reflexive impersonal passives in
Norwegian). As noted by Schäfer (2010), reflexives in impersonal passives are not bound
by the demoted external argument. This can be seen in the mismatch in person between
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int. ‘In those days, people danced a lot on their own birthdays’
It should be noted that pronominal possessor is not easily interpreted as
co-referential with the demoted external argument in Swedish. This is
the case for both pronouns and full DP’s in the complements of passive
participles. However, given the right context, what would be violations of
Principle B and Principle C in an active clause, gives rise to no violations
in passive clauses, just as in eventive nominalizations. This is shown in



































‘*Hei murdered John in the murderer’si own house.’
Taken together, the arguments against pro/PRO in passives seem to be
stronger than the arguments for pro/PRO.
One final point is worth making, concerning the correlation between
(passive) participial morphology and underlying external arguments. In
Baker et al. (1989), it was argued that the participial morphology itself
was the phonological realization of an external argument. As argued in
Lundquist (2008), passive participles in attributive position are “verbal
participles” (i.e., they have the same event entailments as participles in
the reflexive and the argument in the agent-phrase in (i) (example from Schäfer 2010):
(i) Nur von uns wird sich/*uns hier täglich gewaschen
only by us is REFL/us.acc here daily washed
Reflexives in passives hence do not constitute an argument for a syntactically present
external argument.
11Another example clearly illustrating this point for English is given below:
(i) a. Van Goghi usually painted out in the fields, but this painting was painted
in hisi/the artist’si own garden.
b. *Van Gogh usually painted out in the fields, but hei painted this painting in
the artist’si own garden.
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passives). Unaccusative verbs form participles that are used attributively,
and in these cases, it is clear that the -ed-suffix cannot be the realization of
a demoted external argument since there was never any external argument
there to begin with:
(32) a. de nyligen(/*fortfarande) anlända männen
the recently(/*still) arrived men
b. de nyligen(/*fortfarande) sjunkna skeppet
the recently(/*still) sunk ship
Note that the adverbial fortfarande is not compatible with the participles
in (32), which indicated that these participles are eventive. Note further
that the participle in (32b) is unambiguously formed from an intransitive
verb sjunka and not the transitive variant sänka.
From now on, I will simply assume that no external argument is syn-
tactically present in passive participles.
2.3. Consequences and extensions
In the subsections above I have argued that no external argument is present
in event-denoting nominalizations and event-implicating participles. Yet re-
flexive interpretations are unavailable. I will argue that the reflexive read-
ings are unavailable for the simple reason that no reflexive morphology is
present: if a verbal root is marked in the lexicon as having two non-co-
referential arguments, then reflexive morphology is needed to change the
co-reference relations.12 This presupposes that verbs actually carry lexi-
cally specified information about argument structure, which I take to be
uncontroversial, although it is not commonly assumed in modern construc-
tivist approaches (like Distributed Morphology and Borer 2005).
In addition to nominalizations and passive participles, there are two
other cases where reflexive interpretations are unavailable for what seem to
be simply the absence of reflexive marking. One case is in the context of
object drop. If an internal argument can be dropped, no reflexive reading






























‘He is in the bathroom washing (himself).’
12This is basically Condition B of Reinhart and Reuland (1993):
(i) Condition B
A reflexive predicate is reflexive-marked.
181
Reflexive readings in nominalizations and participles
In (33a), the object can be dropped. Once it is dropped, it cannot get a
reflexive interpretation.
Another related case is present participles. Object drop in present par-
ticiples is fairly common in Swedish, especially when the participle is used
as a prenominal modifier. Here again, no self-caused/reflexive interpreta-
tion is available. As will be discussed more later, it does not matter if
the participle is formed from a verb that would otherwise receive a typical
“reflexive” reading when combined with a reflexive as in (34a-b), or if it is
formed from verb that otherwise would receive a typical “anti-causative”
interpretation when combined with a reflexive, as in (34c-d) (judgements
for the DP’s in (34) concern only the reflexive/anti-causative readings):13
(34) a. Han hängde sig - *den hängande mannen
He hanged himself - *the hanging man (int. ‘the man who is
hanging himself’)
b. Han tvättade sig - *den tvättande mannen
He washed himself - int. the washing man
c. Dörrarna öppnade sig - *de öppnande dörrarna















‘Darkness fell.’ - ‘the falling darkness’
Note that (34a) is grammatical in either the intransitive stative reading
(‘the man who is hanging’) or marginally in a transitive habitual reading
(‘the man who usually hangs people’), but not in the relevant reflexive
reading. (34b) is also grammatical in the transitive reading, but not in
the relevant reflexive reading. Note that it would be hard to explain the
absence of the reflexive reading in (34b) on pragmatic grounds, given that it
is actually fully acceptable in English, where no reflexive internal argument
needs to be present (for this verb, and other verbs of grooming). The same
goes for (34c) and (34d).14
Below I will argue that arguments are linked to indices on verbal heads
in a verb phrase that is decomposed into several sub-events, and that argu-
ments receive their thematic interpretation from these heads (see Ramchand
13In English, this effect is seen as well, but less clearly since English has a lot more
zero-derived anti-causative and reflexive verbs than Swedish. For a verb like enjoy,
which requires a reflexive argument to get a reflexive reading, the effect is clearly seen —
??the enjoying kids is not felicitous. The behavior of enjoy contrasts with the behavior
of verbs like behave, which only optionally take a reflexive complement (they behaved
(themselves)): Only the behaving/*enjoying kids will get an ice cream.
14For me, the verb stänga ‘close’ requires a reflexive or a passive -s when it is used
as an inchoative/anti-causative verb. The present participle can therefore not be used
intransitively, as in (i) *de stängande dörrarna (“the closing doors”). Examples like (i)
can however be found on the internet, as well as quite a lot of intransitive examples of the
active verb – (ii) dörrarna stänger (“the doors close”). Presumably, only the speakers
who accept (ii) accept (i).
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2008b, and also Baker 2003). In nominalizations and participles, the ver-
bal heads are present, but not the arguments. The following sections will
discuss the following questions, which will lead to an explicit analysis.
• How can we account for the eventive-stative distinction with respect
to the availability of reflexive interpretations?
• What is the function and structural representation of anaphors, and
why do they have a restricted distribution in nominalizations and
participles?
3. A decomposed verb phrase
In this section I will sketch a system that can derive the effects described
above. So far we have said that the absence of the self-caused/reflexive
reading in eventive participles and nominalizations is triggered solely by
the absence of reflexive marking. This statement is quite vacuous unless
we a have an explicitly stated theory of verbal syntax and semantics. I will
provide this in the following section. We also need a theory that says some-
thing about the reflexive interpretations that are available in stative par-
ticiples/nominalizations. In short, we need a theory that can link argument
structure to event structure. We also need a theory of the lexicon-syntax
interface that can correctly regulate the amount of lexical information that
can be lost as lexical elements get inserted in the syntax.
In this paper I will build on ideas about the interaction between argu-
ment structure and event structure developed in Ramchand (2008b). I will
also make use of certain principles that deal with syntax-lexicon interface
that have been developed during the last couple of years at the University
of Tromsø under the label Nanosyntax (see Caha 2009 and Starke 2009). I
will not lay out all of the details of Nanosyntax here, but a couple of de-
tails need to be mentioned. Nanosyntax shares a couple of important traits
with Distributed Morphology (DM, see Halle and Marantz 1993). Most
notably, in both DM and Nanosyntax, both word-syntax (i.e. Morphology)
and phrasal syntax are taken to follow basically the same rules, and are
therefore taken to be handled by the same module. However, whereas DM
assumes all lexical items to be category-neutral, Nanosyntax assumes that
lexical items carry a set of features. A lexical item can be inserted if the
syntax has generated a representation that matches the feature content of
that lexical item. Lexical items are thus inserted after a the syntax has
generated a representation (i.e., late insertion).
Ramchand (2008b) lays out a system that captures the relations between
argument structure and event structure, and that further tries to capture
the variability in e.g. valency that certain verbal roots show. According
to Ramchand, all verbal roots carry a set of features that encode event
structure and argument structure, and these features can be mapped on to
a syntactic structure that carries these features. According to her analysis,
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the verb phrase can be decomposed into three parts: (1) InitP, denoting
a stative initiation subevent that takes as its subject the initiator of the
event (Initiator); (2) ProcP, denoting a process subevent that takes as its
subject the entity that undergoes change (Undergoer); and (3) ResP that
denotes the result state of an event, taking the holder of the result as its
subject (Resultee). The verbal roots contain category features that match
these subevent heads. The verbal roots further carry indices that indicate
whether or not the participants associated with the different subevents are
co-indexed. In (35), the lexical specification of four types of verbs are given:
(35) a. samlaTransitive ‘collect’: [Initi Proci, Resj ]
b. anländaUnacc ‘arrive’: [Initi, Proci, Resi ]
c. skrattaUnerg. ‘laugh’: [Initi Proci]
d. jagaTrans ‘chase’: [Initi, Procj ]
The difference between a transitive verb with an endpoint (35a) and an
intransitive verb with an endpoint (35b), is that the participant that is
associated with the Result subevent is co-referential with the participant
associated with the process and initiation subevent for the intransitive verb,
but not for the transitive verb. In other words, for a verb like anlända
‘arrive’, the sole argument is both initiating, undergoing and carrying the
result of the arriving event. For samla ‘collect’, the carrier of the resultant
state (i.e., the direct object), is not the same as the initiator (i.e., the
subject/agent). For atelic verbs, like (35c) and (35d), we see the same
difference between transitive and intransitive verbs, but in this case, no
ResP is present (which make them atelic). Note that thematic roles are
composite, following this approach, i.e. one and the same DP might receive
thematic entailments from more than one head. In this paper I will assume
that the verb-phrase is only bipartite. I will get rid of the InitP, and have
entries like the ones in (36) and (37) (see Pustejovsky 1995 for the same
idea)15. Below each entry I give the interpretation that the arguments will
receive from the indices on the verb:
(36) a. StängaTransitive (‘close’): [Proci, Resj ]
b. The binder of i is the argument of a process that leads to
a result in which the binder of j is the argument, where the
nature of the process and the result is given by the lexical
content of the verb.
(37) a. FörsvinnaUnacc (‘disappear’): [Proci, Resi]
b. The binder of i is the argument of a process that leads to
a result in which the binder of i is the argument, where the
nature of the process and the result is given by the lexical
content of the verb.
15Information that is related to initiation and intentions behind events I take to be




Ramchand further allows lexical items to underassociate, i.e. a lexical item
may be inserted when only a subset of the features specified in the lexical
item are present in the syntax (see Ramchand 2008a for possible restrictions
on underassociation for lexical verbs). In Nanosyntax, the general idea of
underassociation has been formalized as the Superset Principle:16
• The Superset principle:
The phonological exponent of a Vocabulary item is inserted into a
node if the item matches all or a superset of the grammatical features
specified in the node. Insertion does not take place if the Vocabulary
item does not contain all of the features present in the node. (from
Caha 2007)
When we apply the Superset principle to the verbal lexical entries under
discussion, we see that one and the same entry can lexicalize more than
one syntactic structure. E.g. stänga and samla could be inserted in the
following contexts (at least):
(38) a. [ Proci [ Resj ]]
b. [ Resi]
Försvinna could be inserted in the following two contexts (at least):
(39) a. [ Proci [ Resi ]]
b. [ Resi]
Note that stänga and samla could not be inserted in the following context,
since the feature specification of the lexical items do not match the features
of the syntactic structure:
(40) [ Proci [ Resi ]]
Following the same reasoning, försvinna could not be inserted in the
following context:
(41) [ Proci [ Resj ]]
3.1. Unaccusativity and Reflexivity
Being a reflexive predicate simply means that the participants of the subevents
are co-referential. There are basically two ways for a predicate to be “reflex-
ive” (i.e., having the participants of the two sub-events being co-referential):
1. Lexically reflexive, i.e. Unaccusative: [ Proci [ Resi ]]
16The principle was originally worked out by M. Starke, see also Caha (2009) for
a slight reformulation of the principle, and the Nanosyntax webpage for updates
(http://nanosyntax.auf.net/blog/).
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2. Reflexive marked (i.e., Transitive base): sig – [ Proci [ Resj ]]. The
reflexive pronoun explicitly marks the co-reference between the two
arguments, see below on the insertion of reflexive pronouns.
Note that we now have a theory similar to e.g. Pustejovsky (1995) and
Chierchia (2004), where unaccusatives, both reflexive-marked and lexical,
have external arguments. Further, for our purposes, there is no point in















‘The door opened.’ (‘Unaccusative, anti-causative’)
As noted above, information that might be related to the intentionality of
the arguments is presumably located outside the ProcP.
An Anti-reflexive reading will always be forced in the context [ Proci [
Resj ]], unless a reflexive marker is present. A reflexive reading will always
arise for unaccusative verbs. If the event is simplex (i.e., if it can not be
decomposed into further subevents), the distinction between reflexive and
anti-reflexive cannot be made, given that only one argument is involved.17
The structures that will be relevant to the further discussion are the fol-
lowing:
(43) a. [ Proci [ Resj ]] – Non-reflexive (Transitive)
b. [ Proci [ Resi ]] – Reflexive (Unaccusative)
c. [Res ] - Underspecified
4. Deriving the Anti-reflexive readings
Following Abney (1987) I will assume that both nominalizing and particip-
ial morphology can attach at different heights in the structure.18 For this
paper, I will only look at nominalizing/participial morphology that attaches
either directly on top of Res, or on top of Proc. This will give rise to two
types of nominalizations and two types of participles. Note that nominal-
izing/participial morphology can attach even higher up in the structure in
many languages, presumably after a syntactic subject has been merged, giv-
ing rise to gerundive nominals and participles that have more verbal traits
17As will be discussed in 5.5, some simplex predicates probably have more than one
argument. As far as I can tell, these arguments necessarily have disjoint referents.
18I take it that the only function of participial morphology is to create an adjective




(most noticeably, structures where accusative case on internal arguments is
licensed, see e.g. Lees 1964, Chomsky 1970 and Abney 1987 for discussion.)
4.1. Two types of nominalizations
In eventive nominalizations, the nominalizing morpheme (Nom) is merged









‘the hanging of Saddam Hussein‘’
b. häng: [ Proci [ Resj ]]
c. häng-ning: [ Nom [ Proci [ Resj ]]] = “non-reflexive” interpre-
tation
In (44), Proc and Res are not co-indexed, which forces a non-reflexive inter-
pretation. Note that certain verbal structures lack a ResP, and these can
of course be nominalized as well. Here the question of whether the inter-














‘During the hike, I started to get tired.’
b. vandr: [ Proc ]
c. vandr-ing: [ Nom [ Proc ]]
Further, nominalizations formed from unaccusative verbs will actually be
interpreted as ‘reflexive’, i.e., the arguments of the first subevent and the











‘The artist’s sudden disappearing/disappearance surprised the
fans.’
b. försvinna: [ Proci [ Resi]]
c. försvinnande - [ Nom [ Proci [ Resj ]]] = “Reflexive” interpre-
tation
In other words, eventive nominalizations can be reflexive, but only when it
is encoded in the lexical entry of the underlying verb that it can lexicalize
a Proc-Res sequence where the two heads are co-referential.
In result nominalizations, the nominalizing suffix is merged straight on
top of a ResP, i.e., they have the simple structure illustrated in (47):
(47) Nom [ Res ]
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A couple of examples of Result nominalizations are given below:
(48) a. Det var en stor öppning i väggen.













‘An early Beatles recording was found in the attic.’
c. Han har en stor samling av värdefull konst.
‘He has a big collection of valuable art.’
Given that we only have one verbal head present in these constructions, we
need not worry about co-reference relations. The syntactic/semantic repre-
sentation says nothing about the nature of the ‘causer’ argument here, given
that the ‘causer’ is simply not present in the representation. The result
nominalizations are surely accidently compatible with self-caused/reflexive
interpretations, but a reflexive interpretation is never forced since the in-
formation about the causer is absent. A reflexive interpretation could only
be forced if two heads are co-indexed, and that could never happen in the
simplex result nominalizations.
4.2. Two types of passives
Just as for nominalizing morphology, participial morphology can attach ei-
ther directly on Res, or on Proc. The anti-reflexive interpretation discussed
above arises when the participial morphology is merged on top of a [ Proc
[ Res ]] sequence, where the two heads are not co-indexed, as in (49) and
(50):
(49) a. Han blev mördad.
‘He was murdered.’
b. mördad: [ Part [ Proci [ Resj ]]]
(50) a. den mördade mannen
‘the murdered man’
b. mördad: [ Part [ Proci [ Resj ]]]
Unaccusative verbs can also be the input to eventive participles, and in
these cases, we do get a ‘reflexive’ participle, i.e., a participle where the
two heads are co-indexed:
(51) a. de nyligen anlända gästerna
‘the recently arrived guests’
b. anlända: [ Proci [ Resi]
c. anländ : [ Part [ Proci [ Resi ]]]
Unergative verbs tend not to form passive participles (or any type of past
participle that can be used attributively). This restriction on unergative
verbs is discussed in detail in Lundquist (2008).
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The stative passives, just like the stative nominalizations, contain only
a ResP, which is diagnosed by the compatibility with the adverb still:
(52) a. Dörren är fortfarande stängd.
‘The door is still closed.’









‘The key is still missing/lost.’
b. försvunnen: [ Part [ Res ]]
(54) a. Johan är fortfarande nedsövd.
‘John is still sedated.’
b. nedsövd: [ Part [ Res ]] (not taking the verb-particle into con-
sideration)
In (52a), we have no information about whether someone has closed the
door, the door has closed itself, or if the door has always been closed. In
(53), an unaccusative verb is used, but still we have no idea what caused
the key to disappear. This kind of information is simply not represented
in the stative participles. In (54), a typical transitive verb is used (i.e., a
verb which is not usually used reflexively), and from our world knowledge
we can guess that someone (or something) has sedated Johan, and he is
not himself the causer/sedator. However, the sentence (54) contains no
information about who sedated him.19
19It has been claimed in the literature that there is a third type of passive participle,
called the resultant state participle (see Kratzer 2000) or resultative participle (see Em-
bick 2004). These participles are eventive, in contrast to target state participles, and can,
according to Kratzer, receive reflexive interpretations in German. There could simply be
a difference between German and Swedish here. The examples Kratzer gives are all verbs
of grooming/washing, like the recently washed kids. These verbs show slightly special
properties in Swedish. Though they cannot receive reflexive interpretations, and resist
a target state interpretation when they occur unmodified, they can take the prefix ny
(‘new’, presumably the prefixal form of the adverb nyligen ‘recently’) and receive a reflex-
ive interpretation. Even modification by still is possible in that case: han är fortfarande
nykammad ‘he is still new-combed’. Note that in Swedish, verbs of washing/grooming
that behave like straightforward (non-reflexive) unergative verbs like duscha (‘shower’)
and bada (‘bathe’) form participles with the prefix ny-: nyduschad (lit. “new-showered”
– someone that has recently taken a shower). I have no analysis for this group of verbs
in either Swedish or German. My German informants however notes that the reflexive
reading, while easily accessible for verbs of grooming/washing (ia), is not available for at
least some other types of reflexive verbs (ib) (special thanks to Eva Engels for discussing






























‘The man has been hanged for two hours.’ (reflexive interpretation unavail-
able)
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5. The nature of reflexive predicates
The above sketched proposal leaves two important questions unanswered:
(1) How is a transitive verb (i.e. [i, j]) ever inserted in a reflexive or an
unaccusastive (i.e. [i, i ]) structure, and (2) why is it not possible to insert
a reflexive pronoun in nominalizations and participles in Swedish? I will
start with the first question, and suggest that simple reflexive elements can
be inserted in a verbal head, and thereby re-code the lexically specified
argument structure of the verb. A short overview of how reflexives in
Swedish behave will first be given.
5.1. Reflexive elements in Swedish
As will be shown in the following section, in Swedish, a third-person re-
flexive sig in the complement of a verb is always bound by the syntactic
subject of that verb. There is in other words no long-distance binding of
simple third person object reflexives (i.e. sig). I will show that there are
however contexts where long-distance binding of an anaphor is possible in
Swedish, as in e.g. possessors inside internal arguments and anaphors inside
adjuncts. This fact is in accordance with the claims made by Reinhart and
Reuland (1993) and Pollard and Sag (1992) that we need a separate part
of the binding theory (or a reformed more general theory) that takes care
of co-reference relations between the arguments of a predicate. I will argue
that simple reflexives in the complement of a verb are in fact located in a
verbal sub-event head, while other reflexives can be located in argument
positions. This extends to first and second person reflexives as well (i.e., to
the whole series sig (third person), mig (first person, singular), dig (second
person, singular), oss (first person, plural), and er (second person, plural)).
It is easy to see that an anaphor in a direct object position is always
bound by the nearest subject – no matter if it is overt or an implicit PRO.
This can be seen in object control sentences (55). Observe that it makes
































‘I forced him to wash himself.’
There is some variation among Swedish speakers with respect to the accept-
In Swedish, the prefix ny- will, as far as I’m aware, only trigger the reflexive interpreta-
tion with verbs of grooming, indicating that this group cross-linguistically shows special
properties. In Lundquist (2008) I acknowledge the fact that there is a third type of
passive, i.e., a resultant state passive, but I argue that the resultant state passive, just
like the verbal passive, contains a full VP (i.e., a ProcP), and the difference between the
two is encoded higher up in the structure (i.e., it is a difference in VP-external aspect).
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ability of long-distance reflexives of this type which is worth mentioning.
The availability of long-distance anaphors across Scandinavia is being in-
vestigated within the ScandDiaSyn-project (Lindstad et al. 2009). Here
speakers are given the task of judging the grammaticality of a wide array
of sentences using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being ungrammatical, 5 being
completely grammatical). The sentence han bad mig hjälpa sig (‘Hei asked
me to help refli’) has been tested on speakers across Scandinavia, and
the mean value for the Swedish speakers for this sentence is currently 2.3
(only 19 % of the informants give this sentence 4 or 5, indicating that the
majority of Swedish speakers, 81%, find this type of long-distance reflexive
marked or completely ungrammatical). In Norwegian this type of long-
distance anaphor is more common though. Questions regarding variation
will be returned to in section 5.4.
In subject control sentences (56), an anaphor in the complement of the
verb is also bound by the PRO-subject of the infinitive (here there is no


































Int. ‘I promised him that I would wash him.’
It is also clear that a non-reflexive object can never give rise to a reflexive






























‘He promised me to wash him.’
The data presented in (55a) to (57) are captured in the binding theory as
proposed by Reinhart and Reuland (1993):20
20Reinhart and Reuland claim that the difference between the verbs that take simplex
reflexives and verbs that take complex reflexivesis that verbs that take simplex reflexives
are lexically reflexive, while verbs that take complex reflexives are underlyingly transitive
verbs. I will remain agnostic to this claim. R&R further make a distinction between se-
mantic predicates and syntactic predicates. “Semantic predicate” refers to the predicate
and the argument-structure it is lexically specified to take. In the framework used here,
it refers to the lexical specification of the verb, i.e., the heads that the verb can lexicalize,
plus the relevant co-reference possibilities of the elements in the specifiers. “Syntactic
predicate” refers to the argument/event-structure actually realized in the syntax. R&R
argue that their condition B is sensitive to the notion of semantic predicate, based on
examples like:
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(58) 1.If a predicate is reflexive marked, it is reflexive. (Reinhart
and Reuland’s Condition A)
2.If a predicate is reflexive, it is reflexive marked. (Reinhart
and Reuland’s Condition B)
Note that this is a special restriction on direct objects. Reflexive pronouns
in PPs for example need not be bound by the PRO in the controlled infiniti-
val clause, as shown in (59) (observe further that the non-reflexive personal



















‘She asked me to stay with her overnight.’


















‘He forced me to re-write his memoirs.’
In the ScanDiaSyn project, long-distance binding of possessive anaphors
has also been investigated. The mean value for the sentence hon bad mig
passa sin katt (‘Shei asked me to look after refl’si cat’) is 3.9 (compared to
2.3 for a simple long-distance reflexive in the complement of a verb), with
68 % of the informants grading it 4 or 5. The data from the ScanDiaSyn
data collection thus very clearly shows us that the majority of the Swedish
speakers have different restrictions on anaphoric possessors and anaphors
in the direct complement of verbs.21
(i) a. Maxi heard a story about himi.
b. Maxi told a story about him∗i.
The co-reference between the subject and the pronoun is impossible in (ib), but possible
in (ia). The explanation behind the difference is that the noun story actually has an
“Originator/Author”-role in its lexical representation. However, this role does not seem
to be present in the syntax, according to R&R. This solution is incompatible with my
general claims about reflexivity and the syntax-semantics mapping. I would prefer to
seek an account of the data in (i) in the different binding properties of arguments with
different thematic roles. For example, as can be seen in Swedish, theme arguments,
especially inanimate themes, can have a clause-mate co-referential pronoun in contexts
where agents would require a reflexive anaphor (see Sundman 1987 for discussion on
animacy, thematic roles and binding in Swedish).
2155 % of the informants interviewed so far (90 informants, 28th of August 2010) judge
long-distance possessive anaphors as OK (4 or 5) and long-distance anaphors in the
complement of a verb as marked or ungrammatical (< 3). 26 % of the informants found
both types of long-distance anaphors marked or ungrammatical (< 3), and 14 % found
them both acceptable (> 4). Note that possessive anaphors still need a local antecedent.
Anaphoric possessors in the complement of a verb in a finite subordinate clause cannot be
bound by the subject of the main clause. This is tested in the ScanDiaSyn questionnaire
as well, and the mean value for this type of sentence is 1.3.
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In other words, it is important to note that simple short-distance reflex-
ives in the complements of verbs behave differently from simple reflexives in
the complements of prepositions and anaphoric possessors. In the literature
it has frequently been pointed out that simple reflexives in the complement
of verbs, i.e. the reflexives that make a predicate “reflexive”, behave differ-
ently from typical internal arguments. As e.g. Kayne (1975), Alsina (1996)
and Medová (2007) have shown, reflexive predicates behave like intransi-
tive predicates rather than transitive predicates in many languages. This
is the case in Swedish too. In Swedish, generally only intransitive verbs
are allowed in existential clauses. As shown in (61b), a reflexive pronoun is
allowed in existential clauses, but not an argumental pronoun ((61a) shows




























‘A man lay (*me) down in bed’



















‘Some men washed (themselves) down at the beach.’
Note that the first or second person verbal reflexive could never be used
in an existential clause, given the definiteness restrictions on the associate
and that first and second persons are obligatorily definite. There is how-
ever another contexts where verbal reflexives, no matter the person-value,
behaves differently from argumental pronouns. In (63a), a first person ver-
bal reflexive appears before a verb-particle. In (63b), the morphologically


























‘He threw me into the room.’
22Direct objects are obligatorily placed after all sorts of verb-particles in Swedish.
Verbal reflexives are in general placed after verb-particles as well, though some particle
verbs take a reflexive before the particle. I will not be able to give an account of exactly
what determines the order of the reflexive and the particle, but instead I just point out
the difference between reflexive and non-reflexive elements.
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I therefore suggest that simple anaphors with any person or number features
can be either arguments or verbal elements. I will call the second type
of reflexives verbal reflexives. When they reflexive-mark a predicate, i.e.
change the lexically specified co-reference relation between the arguments
of a verb, they are always verbal elements. As complements of prepositions
and as long-distance anaphors (and also first and second person arguments
of verbs) they are arguments. Note that the distinction between verbal and
argumental reflexive will capture many of the distinctions that Reinhart and
Siloni 2005 capture by making a distinction between lexical and syntactic
reflexives.23 It is not obviously the case that a language will have an item
that will go both in argument position and in a verbal position. We are
thus not surprised that some languages use different morphology in typical
unaccusative or anti-causative contexts (which would necessarily involve
re-coding of the argument structure) and some long-distance “reflexive”
contexts, that should involve an argumental reflexive.
There is another more subtle test to distinguish simplex verbal reflex-
ives from complex reflexives, regular pronouns and simple long-distance
reflexives, and that is coordination. In my Swedish, simple verbal reflex-
ives can not be co-ordinated. There is however a huge variation among
speakers here (see e.g. Kiparsky 2002 for reports on completely different
judgements), but given the interesting differences between simple verbal
reflexives and other simple reflexives, I choose to include this set of data.
Most importantly, simple reflexives in the complement of a verb cannot
easily be co-ordinated, while reflexives in adjuncts can, as shown in (64).


















































‘She arranged a meeting at her and her partner’s place.’
23I think however that simple parametric choice between lexical and syntactic reflex-
ives, or verbal and argumental reflexives, is not enough to capture all of the differences
in the anaphoric system of different languages. At least two other factors are involved.
First, some languages have more verbal lexical entries that are under-specified for co-
reference relations than others (e.g., English allows more morphologically unmarked
causative-inchoative alternations than e.g. Swedish, but still there are limits on En-
glish). Secondly, languages differ in the person/number marking of anaphors. Some
languages allow third person reflexives as a “default” form (occurring with first and
second person antecedents), while other languages require person/number agreement on
anaphors. Both issues will be returned to briefly below.
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‘My mother washed me and my brother before we went to bed’
Let us assume that reflexives (including first and second person pro-
nouns in reflexive contexts) can only be co-ordinated if they occupy an
argument position.24 We then have to suggest that short-distance, simple
reflexives in the complement of verbs are not truly arguments. I will ar-
gue that they rather instantiate a verbal head (see Zubizaretta 1992 and
Folli 2001 for an analysis of this kind for Romance reflexive clitics). This
indicates that the both first person object pronoun mig (and second person
object pronouns) and the third person reflexive pronoun sig have two dif-
ferent functions: the first one is as a verbal morpheme, lexicalizing a head
that introduces a sub-event (presumably Res), and the second one is as a
regular argument, behaving like a regular pronoun. Reflexives will however
only turn up as arguments in “non-reflexive” contexts.
Given that complex reflexives can be co-ordinated, I will assume them
to be regular arguments . The question is then whether verb-phrases with
complex reflexive complements have an altered argument structure, i.e.,
whether the indices on the verbal heads are re-coded. I will remain ag-
nostic on this point, leaving the alternative open that these sentences are
underlyingly transitive. If this is the case, we could expect there not to
be full co-reference between the anaphor and the antecedent, but possibly
a mind-body split or a split in consciousness between the two arguments.
I leave this matter for future research, although I will mention briefly in
section 5.2 that the fact that complex reflexives may occur in the comple-
ments of eventive nominalizations could be taken as support for a transitive
analysis of verbs with complex reflexive complements.
5.1.1. How to use a reflexive
In section 3 I sketched a system that made use of late insertion, and that fur-
ther assumed that lexical entries contain category features (of the type Proc
and Res for verbs) as well as information about co-reference between dif-
ferent features. Following this system, the absence of reflexive/self-caused
readings for certain types of participles and nominalizations has its root
in the impossibility of inserting a transitive verb in a context where two
24It should be noted that typology of pronouns proposed by Cardinaletti and Starke
(1999) does not cover the +/– reflexive distinction made here. The restriction on co-
ordinating anaphoric pronouns cannot be explained by them being light pronouns or
clitics, since they can be co-ordinated once they are not reflexive marking a predicate.
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heads are co-indexed for arguments, i.e., a lexical item that is specified as
[Proci [Resj ]] can not lexicalize the following string: [Proci [Resi]]. This is
easily illustrated for the verb sänkatrans ‘sink’ in (66). In (66a) we see that
the verb is obligatorily transitive, i.e. an internal argument is required. In
(66b) the verb is used as an anti-causative, and as an anti-causative the re-
flexive is necessarily present. (66c-d) shows that the anti-causative reading






























int. ‘the fallen darkness’
The next question to answer is how to actually get a transitive verb
to lexicalize a stretch of Proc and Res carrying identical indices. Let us
start by assuming that the underlying semantic structure for the following
English/Swedish pair is identical (i.e., [Proci [Resi]]).
(67) a. Dörren öppnade sig.
The door opened REFL
b. The door opened.
The Swedish lexical item öppna and the English lexical item open however
must be different. The lexical item öppna is stored in the lexicon with
the information that the argument of Proc and Res are not the same, while
open must be underspecified. I will for now assume the following two lexical
entries:
(68) a. öppna: proci, resj
b. open: proc, resi
I will assume that (67a) and (67b) have the same underlying representa-
tions (for the verb phrase, [Proci, Resi]. In English, the verb open can
be inserted in that context, given that it has no argument specification
on Proc. In Swedish however, this is not possible without the help of a
reflexive pronoun. The question is then, how does the reflexive make it
possible for the transitive verb to be inserted in a context where Proc and
Res are co-indexed. One could speculate that the underlying representa-
tion for the Swedish sentence (68a) is not [Proci, Resi], but rather [Proci,
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Resj ]. In this case, the reflexive would just add the information that i and
j are co-referential. The underlying representation for the English sentence
(68b) would however still be [Proci, Resi], just like any other unaccusative
verb (given that open behaves just like any other unaccusative verb in En-
glish). However, we do not want the underlying semantic representation
to be aware of which lexical elements actually exist in a given language.
The semantic representation should in other words not vary from language
to language. We then need a mechanism that makes it possible for the
transitive verb to be inserted in an unaccusative context.
The first ingredient of the solution is the already presented superset
principle. In other words, we have a mechanism that makes it possible for
us to insert a lexical item when not all features are present in the syntax.25
The second ingredient was presented in previous section, i.e., an analysis
of reflexives that takes them to be heads in the verbal functional sequence,
rather than arguments (as in Zubizaretta 1992 and Folli 2001). More specif-
ically, I claim that sig (or any of the non-third person forms of the reflexive)
can lexicalize a Res head. When there is no lexical item that matches the
structural description generated by the syntax, e.g. [Proci [ Resi]] in the
case of öppna, the reflexive element can be inserted in Res, while the verbal
element only lexicalizes Proc (thereafter, the verbal element moves further
to lexicalize higher projections in the clausal spine, say Pred(ication) and
T(ense)).26 Inserting a reflexive is in other words a last resort strategy
– there is no lexical item matching the syntactic structure, and therefore
two separate elements, i.e. the verb and the reflexive, are used to lexicalize
the structure. The only function of the reflexive is to identify a Result sub-
event, and further specify that the referent involved in the Result sub-event
is identical to the referent of a structurally higher sub-event.
5.2. Why is there no overt reflexive marking on participles and
nominalizations?
We have now seen that the simple reason for the absence of a reflexive
reading on most participles and nominalizations is the absence of reflexive
marking. A legitimate question is then why we cannot put reflexive marking
on them, to get the reflexive interpretation.
Starting with verbal passive participles, the same restrictions that hold
for unaccusative verbs in general are expected to hold for reflexive verbs,
i.e., the same restrictions that makes *they were being arrived ungrammat-
25Note that it is important that the index and the sub-event feature not be split. If
we were to allow underattachment solely of the index, then every verb could be inserted
in an unaccusative/co-indexed context.
26In some cases, it quite obvious that the reflexive adds a Resultative subevent to
an otherwise atelic event, for example in resultative phrases added to unergative verbs,
e.g. springa sig trött ‘run oneself tired’. It could otherwise be argued that the reflexive
element lexicalizes Proc, and the verbal root Res. In this paper I choose to assume that
all verbal reflexives are inserted in Res.
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ical should rule out a verbal passive from an anti-causative or a reflexive
verb.27 However, when it comes to attributive participles, we expect re-
flexive verbs, with explicit reflexive marking, to be as acceptable as unac-
cusative verbs. This is however not true (remember that I have argued that
unaccusative verbs form eventive participles that can be used attributively):
(69) a. de nyligen anlända gästerna (unaccusative)
‘the recently arrived guests’
b. en nyligen sjunken ub̊at
‘a recently sunk submarine’
(70) a. den (*sig) hängda (*sig) mannen (reflexive)
the (refl) hanged (refl) man (int. ‘the man who hanged
himself’)
b. den (*sig) öppnade (*sig) dörren (reflexive/anti-causative)
the (refl) opened (refl) door (int. ‘the door that opened
(itself)’)
There are several plausible explanations for the unacceptability of the re-
flexives in (70). The post-participial reflexive is presumably out due to a
general ban on non head-final modifiers in Swedish. The participial ending
is presumably the head of the participial modifier, and hence the participle
has to be the final element of the attributive modifier. When it comes to
the pre-nominal reflexive, one could argue that the order reflexive-verb in
general is illicit, which could be due to restrictions on movement (it could
for example be seen as a crossover effect). Another more plausible analysis
is that the verbal anaphor needs person and number features present in or-
der to spell out. It is highly likely that attributive participle phrases (and
prenominal modifier phrases in general) lack any type of person informa-
tion. Thus, the form of the reflexive would not be able to be determined .
(This presupposes that the third person form sig is not a default form, but
an explicit third person form.)
In nominalizations, we can actually use an overt reflexive pronoun, but
only a complex reflexive, once a binder is present, either as a possessor in
the DP, or somewhere outside the DP, as in (71):
27But compare the availability of impersonal passives in certain languages, as discussed
in footnote 10. If one gives a strict unaccusative analysis of reflexive verbs, one would
expect the reflexive verbs to be as bad in impersonal passives as unaccusative verbs. In
German, the reflexive impersonal passives however seem to be slightly better than the
unaccusative impersonal passives. This indicates that in German, reflexive verbs are
treated as unergatives, which is supported by the fact that they take the auxiliary haben
rather than sein, just like unergative and transitive verbs. For languages that do not
allow impersonal passives of reflexive verbs (Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch etc. see Schäfer
2010 for an overview), we could take this to be an indication of their unaccusative status.
































‘He invested a lot of time in the care-taking of himself.’
Simple reflexives are not licit in the complements of nominalizations
(see e.g. Teleman et al. 1999, and see Siloni and Preminger 2009 on cross-
linguistic variation with respect to reflexive marking on nominals). One
reason for the absence of simplex reflexives in nominalizations might be the
clitic-like behavior of the simple reflexive. However, this is unlikely, given
that we have seen reflexives in the complement of prepositions that do not
show reflexive behavior. What is more likely is that a simple reflexive in a
verbal position needs a very local antecedent. More specifically, a subject
with interpretable person and number features needs to be present to deter-
mine the very shape of the reflexive. It should be noted that even first and
second person simple reflexives are unavailable in nominalizations, which
indicates that verbal reflexives, irrespective of person and number value,
need syntactically present, local antecedents. Reinhart and Siloni (2005)
and Siloni and Preminger (2009) claim that reflexives in nominalizations
are only allowed in languages that have lexical reflexives, i.e., reflexives
that are combined with a predicate in the lexicon rather than in the syn-
tax. It is hard to find data to justify this claim, and many of the languages
that Siloni and Preminger (2009) discuss show patterns that go against
the claims made by the authors (e.g., Czech has syntactic reflexives, but
still allows them in nominalizations, German and Dutch differ, according
to the authors with respect to where reflexives enter the derivation, though
they still show no difference with respect to the availability of reflexives
in nominalizations). The generalization rather seems to be the following:
languages that have a reflexive that does not inflect for person and number
allow reflexives in nominalizations (i.e., those languages that allow strings
like ‘I washed se’ meaning ‘I washed myself’).
Present participles (and nominalizations too, to some extent), can some-
times host the prefix själv ‘self’, i.e., the second part of a complex reflexive,
and in these cases, a reflexive reading is available. Note however that this
is only an option for verbs that preferably take the complex reflexive. Pre-
fixation of själv to passive participles is not possible. As will be shown
below, present participles are structurally “bigger” (i.e., they contain more
structure, and presumably spell out a superset of the features spelled out
by the passive participle). This suggests that the prefix själv selects for a
feature that is present in the present participle but not the past participle.
This feature is presumably located higher up in the functional sequence.
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5.3. Overt external arguments in nominalizations and passives
So far I have said nothing about the status of overtly present external
arguments in nominalizations and passives. As is well known, an external
argument can surface in passives as a by-phrase (72a) (av in Swedish), and






















‘the government’s spreading of lies’
I have not yet been explicit about the status of the indices on the verbal
items. Therefore, in this section I will discuss the status of indices and
overtly present external arguments in nominalizations and passives.
The indices on the verbal items can be compared to temporal indices
lexicalized by tense suffixes. Following e.g. Reichenbach (1966) and Demir-
dache and Uribe-Etxebarria (2000) I assume the difference between present
tense and past tense to be a difference in the relation between speech time
and reference time. In the present tense, the speech time and the reference
time is co-indexed (i.e. speech time and reference time happen at the same
time), while in the past tense, the speech time and the reference time are not
co-indexed (i.e., the reference time precedes the speech time).29 Without
going into details, we can assume that the past tense morpheme lexicalizes
a head that encodes speech time and a head that encodes reference time
under the condition that the two heads are not co-indexed. A present tense
suffix also lexicalizes the two heads that encodes speech time and reference
time, but only when they are co-indexed The difference between a past
tense morpheme and present tense morpheme is then analogous to the dif-
ference between an unaccusative verb like arrive and a transitive verb like
bring:
(73) a. Present: Speech Timei, Reference Timei
28In Swedish, external arguments can surface as by-phrases in nominalizations as well,
but this is usually a bit marked (compared to e.g. English). One reason for this might be
that the preposition av also introduces internal arguments in nominalizations (equivalent
to of in English), and the stacking of two av-phrases might be avoided as far as possible.
29Reichenbach (1966) and Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (2000) argue that three
types of relations can hold between speech time and reference time: within/equal,
before and after. The before-relation is used to describe the future tense (i.e., the
speech time is before the reference time). However, I think there are good reasons to
treat future tenses as a kind of modality (i.e., a relation between worlds, see Sarkar
1998), and keep the number of possible relations between speech and reference time to
two: co-indexed and not co-indexed. Given that speech time = now (disregarding em-
bedded clauses), and that statements about the future involve modality, a non-coreferent
reference time will necessarily be located prior to speech time, giving rise to past tense.
Justifying this claim lies far outside the scope of this paper though.
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b. Past: Speech Timej, Reference Timei
c. Arrive: Proci, Resi
d. Bring: Procj, Resi
Pushing the parallel further, we can take overtly present external arguments
in passives (72a) nominalizations (72b) to be similar to temporal adverbials,
as in (74):
(74) I bought the book on Monday.
It is hard or impossible to convincingly argue that there is an implicit
temporal adverb present to encode the pastness in a past tense sentence
lacking an overt temporal modifier, as in (75):
(75) I bought a book PROthen.
Rather, the pastness is presumably solely encoded in the relation between
speech time and reference time. The function of the temporal adverbial is
to modify, or give an exact value, to the temporal indices (more exactly,
to the index in Reference Time). Reflexive and anti-causative readings in
eventive nominalizations and passives containing transitive verbs are just
as impossible as present tense interpretations of past tense verbs, and for
the very same reason. Thus, we do not need to assume that nominalizations
or passives contain an actual external argument position.
Possessors in eventive nominalizations seems to have a more restrictions
on their interpretation than possessors in resultative nominalizations and
underived nouns. The possessor in eventive nominalizations can easily be
interpreted as an agents or temporal modifier, and more restrictively as a






































‘His arrest led to big protests.’
Other interpretations, for example locative, benefactive/goal, possessor and
commitative, seem to be unavailable. (77b) shows the unavailability of a
benefactive/goal interpretation:
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‘his constant sending of letters with indecent content’
The possessor in (77b) can only be interpreted as an agent, not as a bene-
factive/goal. In a result nominalization with a possessor, e.g. his gift, the
possessor could be interpreted either as an agent (or possibly source) or as
a goal (or possessor).
In short, the existence of by-phrases does not necessarily mean that the
nominalization or participle contains a subject specifier. This is because
we have independent evidence that adjunct phrases can function to further
specify structural elements that are present either only as indices or as
implicit content on a head. While these adjunct phrases are sensitive to
the semantic constraints on those indices and are thus constrained in their
interpretation, as shown above, this does not mean that they are themselves
in subject position, or even that a subject position exists. Instead, in the
absence of a convincing cross-categorial definition of ‘Grammatical Subject’
, I will assume that the structures corresponding to nominalizations and
participles are sufficiently different from verb phrases that the same notion
of subject cannot be applied to them. In this I am essentially in agreement
with Grimshaw (1990) and Alexiadiou (2001).
5.4. Summing up, clarifying and extending
Above I have argued that simple reflexive elements (with any person and
number value) in the complements of verbs are not arguments, but ver-
bal elements. This is not a controversial claim, and similar analyses have
been thoroughly argued for i.e. reflexive clitics in Romance and Slavic (see
Kayne 1975, Alsina 1996, Folli 2001 and Medová 2007). I have also argued
that the simple reflexives themselves can be arguments, although usually
not when they occur as complements of verbs.30 The items sig (third per-
son), mig (first person, singular), dig (second person, singular), oss (first
person, plural) and er (second person, plural) thus can be inserted in two
different types of position: in an argument position (presumably D) and in
verb-position (presumably Res). Whereas other researchers have tried to
capture this duality as an indication of Syntax-Lexicon split (see e.g. Rein-
hart and Siloni 2005 and Siloni and Preminger 2009), I argued that both
types of anaphores are syntactic, placing the difference in the argumental-
30In languages that allow long-distance reflexives in direct object positions, simple
reflexives can of course be arguments.
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verbal distinction. Presumably, verbal and argumental anaphors still share
some features – i.e., the homophony between argumental sig and verbal sig
is not accidental (the same holds for verbal (“reflexive”) and argumental
mig etc.). It is possible that the property that they share is that none of
them introduce a new referent, but rather is co-referential with another syn-
tactically present referent. I wish to stress here that first and second person
object pronouns should be treated identically to the third person reflexive
sig. If one takes features for Speaker (and possibly Hearer) to be encoded
in the left periphery of the clause, as suggested by Giorgi (2009), then even
the first and second person pronouns could be argued to be anaphors (i.e.,
they do not introduce new referents).
As we further have seen, anaphors can also be used as possessors, and
as possessors they show typical adjectival inflection.31 We thus have three
positions for the anaphoric elements, and these position might very well
correspond to N(oun) (or D), V(erb) and A(djective). It is thus likely that
the anaphors (in the extended meaning including first and second person
object pronouns) are highly underspecified for category.
I now wish to return to some of the variation mentioned above. The
data collected in the ScanDiaSyn-project indicated that the majority of
Swedish speakers allow long-distance possessive anaphors, but not long-
distance binding of anaphors in the complement of verbs. This could indi-
cate that all instances of simple reflexives in the complements of verbs are
verbal reflexives for this group of speakers (as opposed to first and second
person object pronouns, that obviously can be arguments of verbs). Given
that all speakers of Swedish, as far as I am aware, allow simple reflexives
(sig) in the complement of prepositions, we have to acknowledge that the
lexical element sig can be an argument as well. The question is then why
sig is not acceptable as an internal argument of a verb for the majority of
Swedish speakers (including myself). The grammar must contain a specific
rule that states that simple reflexives can not be used as an argument. I will
hypothesize that this rule has developed as a way of avoiding ambiguity.
There are three ways of referring to a third person referent in Swedish: a
simple reflexive, a complex reflexive (as a local anaphor) or a third person
pronoun (when the antecedent is non-local). Possibly, speakers of Swedish
avoid the simple reflexive in contexts where it is ambiguous, given that
there are non-ambiguous alternatives. When it comes to prepositions, a
reflexive in the complement must be interpreted as an argument (i.e., it
cannot be a “verbal reflexive”).32
31As possessors, the anaphors show number and gender agreement with the head noun.
Non-anaphoric possessors do not show any agreement with the head noun (counting
first and second person pronouns as anaphors). The first person plural possessor is
“irregular”, and spells out as v̊ar rather than the expected oss(an).
32It seems to be the case that speakers who allow long-distance sig in the complement
of verbs, also tend to allow co-ordination of sig and a DP. This at least seems to be
the case for the Norwegian speakers I have asked, who all allow long-distance sig in the
complement of a verb, and sig in co-ordinations. Presumably, these speakers do not
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5.5. Restrictions on stative participles and nominalizations
The system sketched above predicts that all lexical items should be able
to underassociate freely. We would therefore expect that all verbal lexical
items that contain Res should be able to shrink to stative participles and
result nominalizations. This is however not true, as we have seen in the
discussion above (i.e. hängd ‘hanged’ does not have a stative reading). This
section tries to explain the restrictions on underassociation.
The superset principle leads to situations where more than one lexical
item can be inserted. Take for example the two verbs/auxiliaries have and
be. As has been noted since Benveniste (1966), these verbs seem to share
certain features (see also Kayne 1993). More specifically, have seems to
contain be (most likely, have is be + a preposition). Let us assume that
be can lexicalize the feature X, while have can lexicalize the feature set [X,
Y]. Given the superset principle, both have and be could be inserted in a
context where only the feature X are present (but be cannot inserted in a
context where both X and Y is present, given that it cannot lexicalize the
feature Y). To make sure that be and not have is inserted when only X is
present, we need an elsewhere principle for lexical insertion:
• Elsewhere principle
Where several Vocabulary items meet the conditions for insertion, the
item containing fewer features unspecified in the terminal morpheme
must be chosen.33 (Caha 2007)
Hence, be, and not have will be inserted when only X is present, given
that have carries an extra feature. The elsewhere principle can therefore
explain why have cannot “shrink” to only lexicalize the feature X.
The elsewhere principle can also help us understand certain gaps in the
availability of stative/resultative nominalizations and participles. One such
gap can be seen in the following paradigm:
(78) a. the recently closed door (Eventive)
b. the recently opened door (Eventive)
(79) a. the still closed door (Stative)
b. the still open/??opened door (Stative)
As discussed in Embick (2004), it seems to be the case that simple
underived adjectives can block participles in some cases, as shown in (79)
and (78). The verbs open and close share most properties as full verbs,
and even as attributive participles, as shown in (78). However, in stative
adhere to the avoid-ambiguity principle.
33This elsewhere principle is formulated to mirror the elsewhere principle used in DM,
where a subset principle is used for lexical insertion. Note also that “terminal morpheme”
is not really appropriate when speaking about Nanosyntax, since we are in most cases
dealing with a complex set of heads. See Caha (2009) and Starke (2009) for alternative
ways of stating the elsewhere condition.
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contexts, there is a special underived form for open that seems to block
the predicted participial form opened. No such form exists for close, and
the regular participle has to be used instead. We can speculate that the
underived adjective open has fewer unspecified features than the complex
form open-ed, and the form open is therefore inserted. Below I will argue
that this type of blocking can occur even when the blocking lexical item is
identical neither in form nor in meaning to the blocked item.
In a system that allows under-attachment, a lexical item should always
be able to surface in a syntactic structure where only a subset of the lexical
item’s features are present, unless there exists another lexical item with a
smaller subset of features that has exactly the same encyclopedic content
(the elsewhere principle, as stated above). We should then expect that all
verbs that have both a Proc and a Res feature should be able to surface in
three contexts: (i) [ Proc [ Res ]], (ii) [ Res ] and (iii) [ Proc]. The third case
will not be discussed here, i.e., cases where a Res feature is not present.
The trickiest case is the absence of result nominalizations and stative par-
ticiples for verbs that clearly seem to have a result phrase. For example,
the verb hänga ‘hang’ has neither a corresponding stative participle, nor a
corresponding result nominal. The verb försvinna ‘disappear’ has a stative
participle, but not a result/stative nominalizations. The (particle-)verb
spela in ‘record’ has a result nominal, but no stative participle.
There seem to be many factors that restrict the possibilities of under-
association. First, let us focus on verbs likehänga ‘hang’, in the sense of exe-
cution/suicide. I will suggest here that the result participle/nominalization
is blocked by the simpler participle/adjective dead, that presumably lacks
process features. It is a general tendency that verbs of killing and dy-
ing do not have corresponding stative result participles. This holds for
both transitive verbs like execute, assassinate, kill and hang and intran-
sitive/unaccusative verbs like drown and starve (to death). The lack of a
target state participle in these cases could all be explained by blocking:
the result phrase is the same for all these verbs, i.e. dead. The difference
between them is located in Proc. The meaning of these verbs differs in the
manner of the process (i.e., the carrying out of the event) and the argu-
ment structure (co-referential or disjoint arguments of Proc and Res), but
the result is always the same. Possibly, the result nominal associated with
all of these verbs is death.
When it comes to verbs that have a result participle but no result nom-
inalization, or a result nominal but no result participle, other forces must
be at work. Here, we need a more elaborate story about lexical categories,
more in line with Hale and Keyser (1993) (and elaborated in Hale and
Keyser 2002). Some verbs simply have a nominal base, whereas others
have an adjectival or predicative base. The verbs with an adjectival base
presumably require an argument already in ResP, while the verbs with a
nominal base do not. Hale and Keyser’s reasoning about the relation be-
tween lexical category and argument structure was based mainly on verb-
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noun conversion and adjective-verb conversion, but, as argued in Lundquist
(2008), this reasoning has to be extended to overtly derived de-adjectival
adjectives (i.e. participles) and overtly derived de-verbal nouns (i.e. nomi-
nalizations) (see also Lundquist 2009 for a discussion of the relation between
non-derived adjectives and (stative) participles and non-derived nouns and
(result) nominalizations). The absence of a result nominal for the verb
försvinna ‘disappear’ should therefore follow from the very predicative core
of the lexical item in question.
When it comes to verbs of change of location (i.e. fall, arrive, sink,
move etc.), it seems like result/stative nominalizations and participles are
absent for these verbs as well, and it is harder to come up with more basic
nouns/adjectives that block the stative variants. It is likely that in these
cases, the Res is categorically more like a Preposition or Particle. The
forming of a stative participle from fall and sink may very well be blocked
by the manner neutral P down, and in the case of arrive, the blocking lex-
ical item may very well be here. Similarly, when it comes to many double
object verbs (like give), the stative participle may be blocked by something
like a possessive -s or a preposition (with the meaning “possession”, see
e.g. Pesetsky 1995, Harley 2002 and Ramchand 2008b for an analysis of
this kind). In these two cases (location and possession), Res is presum-
ably obligatorily transitive (i.e., it requires one external and one internal
argument).
Exactly how to state the relation between argument structure and cat-
egory, or how to capture the fact that Res is specified as taking two argu-
ments in some cases (locative and possessive cases), one argument in others
(i.e., verbs with only stative participles, or related non-derived adjectives),
or no arguments (in the strictly nominal cases, most commonly for unerga-
tive and non-transitive/weather-verbs), is not clear at the moment, and I
will leave this issue for further study.
6. Concluding remarks
This article has argued against the presence of syntactically present null
external arguments in passive participles and nominalizations. The un-
availability of reflexive and anti-causative readings of participles and nom-
inalizations can thus not have its ground in the binding theory. I have
tried to derive the obligatorily non-reflexive readings in eventive participles
and nominalizations from the lexically stored information about individual
verbs. Assuming that co-reference relations between arguments are en-
coded in verbal heads (i.e., each head carries information about whether
it introduces a new index or not), we already have an explanation for the
absence of reflexive/anti-causative readings of event nominals and eventive
participles. We do not need a syntactically present arguments (PRO, pro
or whatever) to explain these effects.
One major conclusion from the data discussed in this paper is that
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“roots” cannot be completely void of argument structure information and
event structure information. It is simply quite obvious that co-reference
relations between the arguments of a predicate need to be stated in the
lexical entries. It is also obvious that we must be able to tinker a bit with
this lexically specified argument-structure. In this paper, I have claimed
that we get all the flexibility we need from the rules of lexical insertion
given by the Nanosyntax approach.
When it comes to the general issue of “reflexivity”, I have provided
further arguments for the claim that we need to take the co-reference re-
lations between the arguments of a predicate into special consideration, a
claim originally made by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Pollard and Sag
(1992).
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